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205 
THE PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY COMPLEX 
IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA:  
THE PROBLEMATIC APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
The presence of Private Military Companies (“PMCs”) in 
contemporary warfare represents a remarkable transition from warfare 
practices prior to the Cold War.
1
 Instead of traditional overt and direct 
opposition between countries or superpowers, PMCs act as “private 
providers”2 of physical protection or armed force for their clients.3 A PMC 
is a private corporation that specializes in security or armed force.
4
 Like 
any corporation that resides in a particular nation, a PMC must abide by 
the laws of a particular sovereign.
5
 However, given that PMCs often 
contract with countries that face both internal and external conflicts 
(potentially involving other nations), the threat of international conflict 
remains a pressing concern. Since human rights violations are always a 
concern during international warfare, International Humanitarian Laws 
(“IHLs”) aim to control state armies and ensure basic protections of 
human rights in armed conflict.
6
 There is some debate, however, as to 
whether or not IHLs apply to PMCs in the same fashion they can at times 
apply to sovereigns.
7
 IHLs do not explicitly refer to PMCs,
8
 and most 
 
 
 1. Hin-Yan Liu, Leashing the Corporate Dogs of War: The Legal Implications of the Modern 
Private Military Company, 15 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 141, 142 (2010). For the purposes of this 
note, Private Security Companies that participate in armed conflict and Private Military Companies 
will be discussed and referred to collectively as “PMCs” throughout. 
 2. Id. at 141. 
 3. In this context, “client” refers to the government, organization, or entity that a PMC officially 
makes a contractual relationship with. For a more in depth discussion on this relationship, see 
generally id.  
 4. Id. As further support for the analogy to private corporations, PMCs also focus on profit 
margins, revenue, and other financial concepts. The annual market revenue of all PMCs has been 
estimated to be approximately one hundred billion United States dollars as of 2010. Id. at 142; see also 
P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 78 n.10 
(2008). 
 5. See Liu, supra note 1, at 142 (explaining that PMCs do not operate in a “legal vacuum,” but 
rather are subject to a “plethora of legally applicable norms.”) (emphasis added). Liu argues that 
certain laws (specifically, international laws governing human rights) bind PMCs, but those laws are 
insufficient and state legislation is necessary to create a fully functional PMC regulatory framework. 
Id. at 167–68. 
 6. Id. at 167. 
 7. See generally id. Specifically, the author notes that a common accusation in the argument of 
IHL applicability to PMCs is that PMCs operate in a “legal black hole.” Id. at 167. As we will see 
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attempts to retroactively fit PMCs into IHL interpretations have been 
problematic.
9
 International legislation is also partially responsible for the 
difficulties in applying IHLs to PMCs due to the combination of a lack of 
time, effort, and political motivation for some sovereigns to address the 
issues.
10
 As a result, PMC activities potentially fall into a troublesome 
gray area with respect to human rights protections in armed conflict. 
Despite the lack of a major conflict on the scale of the United States’ 
Middle East conflicts, Africa has been a point of considerable interest and 
curiosity with respect to PMC involvement.
11
 Africa has been considered a 
potential stage for increasing PMC involvement for a few reasons. First, 
the conflicts both in and between the various countries of Africa would 
provide a business opportunity for PMCs.
12
 Second, many of the leading 
PMCs originated from Africa and already possess regional geographic 
familiarity.
13
 Third, some African countries have already encouraged the 
use of PMCs by allowing the legislature to regulate their activities.
14
 These 
factors contribute to the notion that Africa is particularly susceptible to, if 
not in some places inviting, PMC activity. 
 
 
further in this Note, countries can attempt to control PMCs in a variety of ways, including the creation 
of internal regulatory provisions and enforcement mechanisms. For the purposes of this Note, it is 
important to keep in mind that PMCs are a relatively recent construct and post-date most IHLs. Id. at 
153.  
 8. Louise Doswald-Beck, Private Military Companies Under International Humanitarian Law, 
in FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 
116, 116 (Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007).  
 9. The various existing literature that struggles to address the application of PMCs to IHLs 
supports this notion. See generally SINGER, supra note 4. 
 10. Doswald-Beck, supra note 8, at 134–35.  
 11. Shaun Randol, Africa: The Next Boon for Private Military Firms?, INT’L AFFAIRS FORUM, 
http://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternalDocument.cfm?ContentID=6566 (last visited Sept. 17, 
2012).  
 12. Id. It is notable that many countries in Africa have difficulties in sustaining sufficiently 
trained army or police personnel due to armed conflicts. By hiring a PMC, the country in question can 
benefit from already-trained military forces with up-to-date technology. In terms of the future, a 
country may wish to continue to employ the PMC for additional contractual obligations. In rare 
examples, a country may opt to directly integrate a PMC into their own military force. See Liu, supra 
note 1, at 155 (citing E-C GILLARD, Private Military/Security Companies: The Status of their Staff and 
their Obligations Under Humanitarian Law and the Responsibility of States in Relation to Their 
Operations, in PRIVATE MILITARY SECURITY COMPANIES: ETHICS, POLICIES, AND CIVILIAN-
MILITARY RELATIONS 532 n.70 (D-P Baker & M. Caparini eds., 2008)). 
 13. Randol, supra note 11. Specifically, Randol notes the Executive Outcomes organization of 
South Africa. Although presently defunct, this PMC was one of the leading PMC firms in the late 20th 
century. Id. For more on the dissolution of Executive Outcomes, see Executive Outcomes, ECONOMY-
POINT.ORG, http://www.economypoint.org/e/executive-outcomes.html (last updated July 13, 2011). 
 14. See, e.g., Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 (S. Afr.); see also Liu, 
supra note 1, at 149–53 (discussing South African attempts at regulation, and the Foreign Military 
Assistance Act specifically). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/6
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HOW CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAWS HAVE 
ATTEMPTED TO TACKLE THE EXISTENCE OF PMCS AND “MERCENARISM” 
There are two major issues fueling this Note’s underlying analysis. The 
first is whether conflicts that usually concern internal affairs of African 
countries can constitute an “international” matter for IHL jurisdiction.15 
Second, if the first issue is answered in the affirmative, it must be known 
if and to what extent there is a pressing danger of human rights violations 
by PMCs in particular. With respect to the first issue, the “international” 
concern could surface through a domino effect of a nation’s allies 
involving themselves in a conflict or war theater.
16
 Alternatively, there 
will be a need for an international presence to quell the flames of war 
when internal conflicts spill over the borders of one country and into 
another.
17
 Addressing the second point requires a more lengthy analysis; 
whether PMCs are more likely to commit human rights violations in 
armed conflicts than sovereigns requires an analysis on why IHLs are not 
easily applicable to PMCs.
18
 
Critics of PMCs disparagingly label PMCs’ philosophies and activities 
as mercenary conduct (often labeled as “mercenarism” with the 
implication that the conduct itself is negative or reprehensible).
19
 
Mercenaries are often portrayed as guns-for-hire in both literature and the 
media, typically motivated by financial gain rather than by a personal 
stake in the conflict.
20
 Arguably, the activities of a PMC are a form of 
mercenarism
21 in the sense that a PMC operates in armed conflicts 
 
 
 15. For example, an “internal” matter could stem from lack of resources. The scenario may 
become an “external” matter when the need for resources creates hostility with neighboring countries, 
as seen in conflicts at the border of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. See infra note 77 
(differentiating the Democratic Republic of the Congo from the Republic of the Congo); Koinange, 
infra note 78 and accompanying text (exemplifying how an internal conflict can become international). 
 16. History shows that this phenomenon can occur. For example, World War I escalated into a 
global conflict when an isolated act of assassination triggered a series of existing alliances among 
European countries. Given the myriad of African nations, the concern of a domino effect of alliances 
that have connections with nations across the world could potentially shift an isolated event to an 
international concern.  
 17. See supra text accompanying note 15; Koinange, infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 18. Specifically, the problem of applying IHLs to PMC activities starts with the fact that PMCs 
only began operating on a significant scale after the drafting of particular IHL pieces that will be 
discussed. See Liu, supra note 1, at 153 (explaining that PMCs are a relatively recent phenomenon, 
post-dating most IHLs). 
 19. Liu, supra note 1, at 143. Liu notes that “[t]he term ‘mercenarism’ connotes ethically and 
morally dubious activities” but does not analyze the association further. Id.  
 20. See Randol, supra note 11.  
 21. Liu states, “The nature of PMC activity is potentially within the sphere of mercenarism.” Liu, 
supra note 1, at 143. 
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pursuant to contractual obligations and could be outside of the contracting 
country’s absolute influence. Moreover, some of the historically infamous 
regimes in Africa attained their political and military might through 
reliance on mercenary activity.
22
 Given the negative connotations of 
mercenary conduct, PMCs may be reluctant to firmly define their activities 
as acts of mercenarism.  
Although mercenarism prior to the Cold War was often regulated or 
historically insignificant,
23
 IHLs have addressed mercenarism in part 
through the Geneva Convention (however, as will be seen, the depth of its 
treatment of mercenarism is a matter of debate).
24
 In international 
conflicts, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (“Protocol I”) states that mercenaries “shall not have the right to 
be a combatant or a prisoner of war.”25 Protocol I also provides a list of 
characteristics that govern who is a mercenary under the Geneva 
Convention (which is non-exhaustive).
26
 However, the mercenary 
definitions possess some troubling limitations when attempting to analyze 
PMCs. First, the definition applies to any “person” but does not mention 
how it applies to a group, organization, entity, or corporation.
27
 Second, a 
mercenary must not be a national of a party in the conflict or a resident of 
territory held by any party in the conflict.
28
 Third, the mercenary must not 
 
 
 22. Id. In addition to decolonization efforts in the 1950s and 1960s, some have also noted a 
“strong link . . . between mercenarism and the apartheid regime in South Africa.” Id. (citing SINGER, 
supra note 4, at 37). The relationship between South Africa and groups engaged in mercenarism, 
however, changed drastically towards the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st 
century. See Simon Chesterman, Leashing the Dogs of War, 5 CARNEGIE REPORTER 1 (2008), 
available at http://carnegie.org/publications/carnegie-reporter/single/view/article/item/73/ (discussing 
late twentieth-century South African legislation designed to “prohibit private military companies from 
operating”).  
 23. Liu, supra note 1, at 141–42. It is possible mercenarism was less necessary during the Cold 
War to aid a nation’s political or military structure, given the lack of full-scale global military 
conflicts.  
 24. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Protocol I].  
 25. Id. art. 47 (emphasis added). The secondary issue of the prisoner of war status for mercenary 
participants will be discussed further in note 32 but will not be a primary focus for this article.  
 26. Id. art. 47, ¶ 2(a)–(f).  
 27. Id. art. 47, ¶ 2. The definition explicitly states, “A mercenary is any person . . . .” Id. 
(emphasis added). In one sense, it is distressing to suggest that the Geneva Conventions intended to 
remove mercenary groups from the definition. However, when looking at the history of regulation or 
insignificance of mercenaries prior to the Cold War, holding mercenaries accountable for potential 
human rights violations on an individual basis might not have been feasible at the time. With that said, 
the definition does not seem to account for a corporation-like entity acting as a mercenary and 
committing human rights violations.  
 28. Id. art. 47, ¶ 2(d). Like the issue with the “person” specification, this also causes confusion 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/6
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be a member of a party’s armed forces in the conflict.29 The 
abovementioned criterion provides an easy escape route for PMCs; PMCs 
can avoid the Geneva Convention’s classifications entirely.30 Not being a 
“person” or being a “national” for Protocol I purposes are some of the 
tactics that could allow PMCs to avoid mercenary classifications. It is 
possible that the Geneva Convention did not take into account the 
potential privatization of security and warfare in its concept of 
mercenarism.
31
 The possible failure to account for the privatization of the 
military potentially allows PMCs to evade the Geneva Convention’s 
accountability provisions for committing violations of human rights or 
being held as a prisoner of war in the same context.
32
 Even an inquiry into 
the non-international (internal) focused Protocol II does not provide any 
assistance in rectifying this issue.
33
 In short, the potentially incomplete 
 
 
when applied to corporations. Arguably (or definitively by law depending on the country), a 
corporation can be considered a resident of a country without being a “person.” See, e.g., Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 667–68 (1819) (explaining that a corporation is an 
“artificial person” subject to suit in court and able to enter into contracts with binding obligations). 
This is especially problematic when considering that PMCs, despite having global markets, are 
generally based in a specific country. Additionally, because a significant number of PMCs are housed 
in African countries, Protocol I’s applicability to PMCs may be problematic if the PMC in question is 
a citizen of a country. Even if a conflict is international, a PMC could potentially evade the Geneva 
Convention entirely by asserting residency in a held territory or claiming the same nationality as a 
country involved in the conflict.  
 29. Id. art. 47, ¶ 2(e). As will be discussed later in this Note, this becomes a major issue in some 
African countries when a PMC is closely aligned to a country and resembles its military but still 
remains a mere contractor.  
 30. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 27–29 (discussing specific ways in which a 
PMC may evade Protocol I’s definition of a mercenary).  
 31. See generally Kevin A. O’Brien, Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation, 
RAND EUR. CAMBRIDGE (2002).  
 32. In paradoxical fashion, falling under Protocol I’s mercenary definition would effectively 
exclude a mercenary individual from being considered as a combatant or a prisoner of war under 
Article 47(1). Article 47(1) implies that non-mercenaries have the right to assert POW or combatant 
status. Some have stated that the exclusion contradicts “the established principal of humanitarian law, 
that all belligerents should be treated equally.” Liu, supra note 1, at 144 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). However, whether or not a PMC would have standing to assert POW or Article 
47(1) combatant status, even if a PMC did fall under the mercenary classification, is another area on 
which the Geneva Convention is silent. However, this inquiry will not be a primary focus of this Note.  
 33. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
[hereinafter Protocol II]. Protocol II is relevant in the sense that it applies to all armed conflicts not 
covered by Protocol I, which  
take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise 
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted 
military operations and to implement this [Protocol II].  
Id. art. 1, ¶ 1. However, Protocol II does not discuss the issue of mercenaries in any detail. Implicitly, 
the responsibility of defining mercenary conduct may fall to the country in question.  
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definition of mercenarism can leave the question of accountability for 
human rights violations open for PMCs when it should be a simple 
inquiry.  
This does not, however, mean that the authors of international 
regulations have never attempted to address mercenarism as it relates to 
PMCs. In the late 20th century, the United Nations attempted to target 
mercenary individuals through the International Convention against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries (“Convention 
Against Mercenaries”).34 The motivation for passing this legislation was 
the prevention of mercenarism aimed at “violat[ing] principles of 
international law, such as those of sovereign equality, political 
independence, territorial integrity of States and self-determination of 
peoples.”35 The definition of “mercenary” in this convention is similar to 
that in Protocol I.
36
 This convention, however, provides alternative 
definitions for a mercenary individual, such as being “motivated to take 
part therein essentially by the desire for significant private gain.”37 
Moreover, this convention takes into account the possible existence of 
mercenary groups and businesses by holding accomplices
38
 or financers
39
 
potentially accountable for human rights violations.  
However, there are some major issues that effectively defang the 
Convention Against Mercenaries. Only 32 countries have agreed to be 
parties to the Convention Against Mercenaries through ratification or 
accession.
40
 Further confounding things, only a small fraction of all 
 
 
 34. International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of 
Mercenaries, G.A. Res. 44/33, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989), available at http://www.icrc. 
org/ihl.nsf/FULL/530?OpenDocument [hereinafter Convention Against Mercenaries]. 
 35. Id. pmbl. In addition, the Convention Against Mercenaries also lists some other concerns that 
motivated its creation, including “new unlawful international activities” concerning drug trafficking 
and mercenarism conducted “in perpetration of violent actions which undermine the constitutional 
order of States.” Id.  
 36. Id. art. 1, ¶ 1(a)–(e). 
 37. Id. art. 1, ¶ 2(b). See generally id. art. 2(a)–(e) (providing additional characteristics of 
mercenaries).  
 38. Id. art. 4, ¶ (b). 
 39. Id. art. 2. Even though the convention does not explicitly state PMCs, there is language here 
holding those who finance mercenary groups as criminally accountable as opposed to the Geneva 
Convention, which did not hold financers accountable. This implicitly supports the notion that the 
convention was also designed for application to groups that integrated mercenarism-esque activities as 
a business model like PMCs and other firms concerning private security. The language of including a 
group who “recruits, uses, finances or trains mercenaries” does not allow a PMC a lot of leeway under 
the convention, assuming that an individual member can fit the mercenary criteria of Article 1, 
Paragraphs 1–2. Id.  
 40. International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of 
Mercenaries, Dec. 4, 1989, 2163 U.N.T.S. 75, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/6
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countries that are parties to the treaty are African countries.
41
 As a result, 
despite its presence as an express attempt to control mercenarism, the 
Convention Against Mercenaries lacks authoritative power in most 
African countries, let alone with other countries internationally. Most 
countries internationally, however, have agreed to both Protocol I and 
Protocol II of the Geneva Convention.
42
 Even though the above-referenced 
countries show some agreement with the Geneva Convention’s definition 
of mercenarism,
43
 this Note will analyze how these states choose to 
criminalize mercenarism. 
How PMCs figure into the IHL framework is still an open question. 
When considering that the international convention designed to discourage 
mercenarism has little authoritative power internationally, the Geneva 
Convention remains the default authority. But as discussed previously, the 
Geneva Convention was not drafted with the idea that highly rigid, 
corporation-like groups engaging in mercenary activities would be 
increasingly commonplace in armed conflicts.
44
 With international 
legislation not adequately prepared to account for PMCs, the next step is 
to determine whether African countries themselves address mercenarism. 
 
 
.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-6&chapter=18&lang=en (Signature, Ratification/Accession, 
Reservation/Declaration List). 
 41. Id. Specifically, only Liberia, Libya, Mauritania, Senegal, Togo, and a few other smaller 
African countries have signed onto the treaty or acceded to the treaty. None of the countries that will 
be discussed in this article have signed or acceded to the treaty. Id. Libya in particular has faced 
criticism in the past by relying on mercenaries to fight in Saharan conflicts. Joseph Ngugi, Dogs of 
War Back As States Cut Spending, THE NATION (KENYA) (Sept. 19, 2011), available at http://www 
.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Dogs-of-war-back-as-states-cut-spending-/-/440808/1239090/-/13y291w/-/ 
index.html. 
 42. See Int’l Comm. Of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I): 
Signature, Ratification/Accession, Reservation Declaration List, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Sept. 16, 2012); Int’l 
Comm. Of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II): Signature, 
Ratification/Accession, Reservation Declaration List, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www 
.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Sept. 16, 2012).  
 43. Some African countries have incorporated IHLs into their constitutions to some degree. See, 
e.g., CONST. OF ANGOLA, 2003 amend., arts. 11–12.  
 44. Again, it must be noted that the proliferation of PMCs post-dated the drafting of the Geneva 
Convention Protocols. It is possible that the framers of the Geneva Convention did not anticipate that 
armed conflict and security would become a highly privatized, finance-driven business venture as 
opposed to containing warring superpowers in the vein of World War II and the Cold War. Given the 
wider use of PMCs in present day, it is very possible that international regulation will take more 
explicit steps on dealing with mercenary activities that could potentially jeopardize human rights. 
Unfortunately, the weak support of the Convention Against Mercenaries may serve as an illustrative 
example of a reluctance to allow mercenarism regulation fall into the hands of international legislation.  
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A LOOK AT CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 
The media and some scholars believe that Africa will be the next target 
for widespread PMC proliferation.
45
 As previously discussed, this notion 
seems quite credible when considering the prevalence of African conflicts 
combined with the significant number of PMCs housed in Africa.
46
 
Despite the gap International Law leaves for PMCs through its potentially 
incomplete language and drafting, some African countries have attempted 
to regulate and even criminalize impermissible mercenarism through 
legislation. Notable examples of African countries that have taken a stance 
on mercenarism include South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Uganda, and Angola. Legislation in these countries will be 
analyzed over other African countries for a number of reasons. These 
include the presence of PMCs in certain countries more than others,
47
 the 
history routine of conflict in the region,
48
 some of the countries having 
affirmative legislation concerning PMCs,
49
 and some countries making its 
stance known concerning international legislation’s difficulty in 
addressing PMCs.
50
 This Note will compare and contrast the different 
approaches of these Central and Southern African countries in regards to 
regulation of PMC activity. At the end of the analysis, this Note will 
synthesize the ramifications that each country’s legislation may have on 
the international community.  
SOUTH AFRICA—A HOSTILE HOME FOR THE PMC 
South Africa is unique in the sense that many PMCs have operated in 
South Africa, have originated from the country, are domiciled in the 
 
 
 45. Randol, supra note 11; Doug Brooks, Private Military Service Providers: Africa’s Welcome 
Pariahs, in GUERRES D’AFRIQUE, Nouveau Mondes No. 10, 69–86 (Laurent Bachelor Geneva ed., 
2002) (unofficial English version available at http://www.hoosier84.com/02-00africaswelcomepari 
ahs.pdf); Zenzile Khoisan, Africa ‘Opening the Door to Private Armies,’ CAPE ARGUS (SOUTH 
AFRICA), Aug. 6, 2004.  
 46. See Randol, supra note 11; Liu, supra note 1, at 155; supra text accompanying notes 11–13.  
 47. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, has seen massive amounts of PMC 
operations in the late 20th and 21st centuries. See Sebastian Deschamps, Towards the Use of the 
Private Military Companies in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, at 25 (Jan. 15, 2005) 
(unpublished thesis, United Nations Institute Peace Operations Training Institute), available at 
http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/deschamps.pdf.  
 48. Id. Deschamps notes that the Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular had a troubled 
history concerning disputes over natural resources and has often seen the use of PMCs in such 
conflicts.  
 49. As the analysis progresses, keep in mind that the Constitutions of Uganda, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, and Angola differ in respects to this subject matter.  
 50. See, e.g., Angola’s Proposal, infra note 126. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/6
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country either presently or at some earlier time, or a combination of all 
three.
51
 Most importantly, South Africa is also one example of an African 
country that has taken explicit steps in regulating PMC activity and 
mercenarism in general.
52
 Interestingly, South Africa contributes to the 
PMC proliferation, yet it still manages to strictly regulate how its society 
interacts with such companies.
53
 South Africa’s primary goal seems to 
limit the capability of its citizens to engage in mercenary-activities.
54
 
South Africa first enacted the Regulation of Foreign Military 
Assistance Act (“RFMAA”) as an attempt to regulate mercenarism.55 The 
RFMAA imposes strict standards concerning mercenarism by 
criminalizing the conduct of any South African citizen that attempts to 
partake in mercenary activities.
56
 Unlike the Geneva Convention, this Act 
also accounts for the presence of PMCs or Private Security Companies 
through the inclusion of “security forces” in the Act.57 Criminal penalties 
include imprisonment, a hefty fine, or both.
58
 The Act does, however, 
 
 
 51. South Africa has a rather interesting history on this point. The South African 32nd Recon 
Battalion was a highly active military force during the apartheid. When being disbanded in the early 
1989, the 32nd Recon Battalion merely rearranged itself into becoming a PMC/Security Company 
housed in South Africa. Chesterman, supra note 22. Executive Outcomes is another example of an 
older, significant PMC that originated from South Africa. See Randol, supra note 11; supra text 
accompanying note 13.  
 52. Chesterman, supra note 22. 
 53. Id. Chesterman states, “South Africa is a rare case of a country that is a significant supplier of 
private military companies adopting strong legislation attempting to prohibit private military 
companies from operating.” Id.  
 54. Id. “[I]t adopted legislation intended to prohibit South African citizens [from] working for 
such companies.” Id. 
 55. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998. The newest piece of regulation on 
this subject is the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities Act 27 of 2006 (S. Afr.). The two statutes do not 
differ substantially. The Prohibition of Mercenary Activities Act’s preamble sets a harsh tone against 
mercenary activities by stating that  
[t]he Constitution of the Republic of South Africa . . . provides . . . that the resolve to live in 
peace and harmony precludes any South African citizen from participating in armed conflict, 
nationally or internationally, except as provided for in the Constitution or national legislation  
Id. (emphasis added). It would seem that the drafters of this legislation were concerned about the 
potential international impact of mercenary-esque activities.  
 56. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 §§ 2–3. The relevant language is 
that “no person” may participate in mercenary activities or offer to render such services. Id. 
 57. Id. § 1(2)(b). For an explanation of the distinction between PMCs and Private Security 
Companies, see supra text accompanying note 1.  
 58. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 § 10(1). For more on this matter, 
see Bjorn Moller, Private Military Companies and Peace Operations in Africa (Feb. 8, 2002) 
(unpublished seminar paper, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute). The exact criminal punishments 
include imprisonment up to ten years and/or fines up to one million Rand (South African currency). Id. 
at 10.  
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permit some forms of mercenarism.
59
 The Act outlines the process for 
obtaining authorization and even lists criteria used in granting or refusing 
authorizations.
60
 The most important provision concerns refusal or denial 
of authorization depending on whether the authorization of a PMC would 
be “in conflict with [South Africa’s] obligations in terms of international 
law.”61 This language would have definitely barred authorizations of 
mercenary activity if South Africa had agreed to be bound by the 
Convention Against Mercenaries. But because the Geneva Convention 
possesses considerable gaps on this subject, the RFMAA alone is the main 
driving force for South Africa to reject or allow authorizations of PMCs.
62
 
Arguably, South Africa’s regulation merely attempts to ensure that a 
PMC will never act contrary to South Africa’s own interests.63 Given how 
interests of a country can fluctuate under various circumstances, it would 
seem as if there is always a possibility for permissible PMC activity in 
 
 
 59. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 § 4. This section allows for “any 
person” to be able to register with the South African government and apply for authorization to 
conduct “foreign military assistance” by the government. Id. § 4(1). It specifies that “the Committee” 
(or more appropriately, a committee) will be in charge of reviewing authorizations for conducting 
mercenary activity. Id. § 4(2) (emphasis added). The authorization, however, has its limitations. For 
instance, an authorization granted cannot be transferred to any other party. Id. § 4(4).  
 60. Id. § 7(1)–(3). This section highlights potential grounds for the Committee refusing 
authorization rather than allowing authorization.  
 61. Id. § 7(1)(a). Other important criteria to note include potential infringement upon human 
rights “in the territory in which foreign military assistance is to be rendered.” Id. § 7(1)(b) (emphasis 
added); encouraging terrorism, id. § 7(1)(d); escalating regional conflicts, id. § 7(1)(e); and prejudicing 
South Africa’s “national or international interests.” Id. § 7(1)(f).  
 62. However, it would seem that a PMC’s interests must align with that of the South African 
government for the authorization to occur in the first place. The RFMAA provides a sort of escape 
route for the South African government in the Exemptions in § 11. It states that the South African 
government “may exempt any person from the provisions of sections 4 and 5 in respect of a particular 
event or situation, and subject to such conditions as he or she may determine.” Id. § 11. In short, South 
Africa may be able to circumvent the authorization process by exempting individuals and corporations 
from the process, assuming that an event or situation calls for it. The fact that the RFMAA does not go 
deeper into what type of event or situation justifies exemption status leaves the issue of potential abuse 
an open question. The Prohibition of Mercenary Activities Act also contains the same language as the 
RFMAA. The Prohibition of Mercenary Activities Act provides similar criteria for “authorisation or 
exemption.” Prohibition of Mercenary Activities Act 27 of 2006 § 9. 
 63. The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act specifies criteria that would officially 
authorize PMC or mercenarism activity. See Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 
1998; Prohibition of Mercenary Activities Act 27 of 2006; supra text accompanying note 62–63. 
However, the challenge, especially when viewed in conjunction with the Geneva Convention, is 
whether or not a PMC would technically be a government instrumentality after obtaining 
authorization. Direct integration would take the integrated PMC directly out of immediate Geneva 
Convention jurisdiction in terms of mercenary activities as the PMC would then be an armed force of a 
country rather than a mercenary group. See Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 47, ¶ 2(e); supra text 
accompanying note 30. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/6
  
 
 
 
 
2013] THE PMC COMPLEX IN CENTRAL & SOUTHERN AFRICA  215 
 
 
 
 
South Africa.
64
 This is not to say that South Africa tends to favor PMC 
and mercenary activity.
65
 The RFMAA’s hostile language implies a rule of 
exclusion concerning mercenary activity.
66
 Moreover, the preservation of 
human rights is a goal that the RFMAA explicitly states more than once.
67
 
The interest of preserving human rights also comes up in South African 
case law discussing potential situations of mercenary conduct. In Kaunda 
v. South Africa,
68
 for example, some general interests include whether 
South Africa at least “enjoys” diplomatic relations with the other country 
in question,
69
 protections of human rights as stated in South Africa’s 
constitution,
70
 and whether the mercenary activity is aimed at provoking a 
“regime-change.”71 Unfortunately, given the lack of publication of PMC 
authorizations in South Africa, ascertaining under what conditions South 
Africa could find that a PMC’s activities both would not impede human 
rights and would conform with South Africa’s interests is unknown.72 
 
 
 64. See Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998; Prohibition of Mercenary 
Activities Act 27 of 2006; Protocol I, supra note 24; supra text accompanying notes 63–64. 
 65. In other words, it cannot be said that South Africa has an affirmative preference for using 
PMCs over the country’s own military and police. This approach differs from the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and Uganda.  
 66. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 pmbl; id. § 11. 
 67. Id. pmbl.; id. § 7(1)(b).  
 68. 2004 (4) BCLR 235 (CC) (S. Afr.). This case came before the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa when 69 South African citizens were being held in Zimbabwe, some accused of being 
mercenaries in order to overthrow the President of the Equatorial Guinea. Id. at 237, ¶ 1. The detainees 
argued that they would be denied a fair trial if they were extradited from Zimbabwe to Equatorial 
Guinea. The Constitutional Court rejected most of the detainee’s arguments. Id. at 251, ¶ 31. RFMAA 
did not perfectly apply here because the detainees would have had to satisfy extradition criteria in 
Zimbabwean law for there to be South African jurisdiction. Id. at 275, ¶ 86. 
 69. “[T]here is a vast difference between defending a mine owner against unlawful assaults on its 
property, and planning a coup against the head of a state with which South Africa enjoys diplomatic 
relations.” Id. at 277, ¶ 90 (emphasis added). 
 70. “The founding values of our Constitution include human dignity, equality, and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms.” Id. at 266, ¶ 65. “The advancement of human rights and 
freedoms is central to the Constitution itself.” Id. at 31, ¶ 231. 
 71. “Mercenary activities aimed at producing regime-change through military coups violate this 
principle in a most profound way.” Id. at 135, ¶ 272. The principle that this quote is referring to is a 
quote from Section 198(b) of the South Africa Constitution which also appears in the preamble of the 
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act: “The resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes 
any South African citizen from participating in armed conflict, nationally or internationally, except as 
provided for in terms of the Constitution or national legislation.” Regulation of Foreign Military 
Assistance Act 15 of 1998 pmbl.  
 72. See Chesterman, supra note 22 (emphasis added). Since Erinys International is an example of 
a PMC that functions in South Africa, the implication is that Erinys fully satisfied the RFMAA and the 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities Act. Office Locations: Africa Regional Office, ERINYS, http:// 
www.erinys.net/#/locations-south-africa/4532932121 (last visited Sept. 26, 2012) (evidencing that 
Erinys is based out of South Africa). But again, due to the lack of publication on authorizations for 
PMCs or Private Security Companies, this question remains open.  
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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO—SILENT RELIANCE ON PMCS 
THAT SOUTH AFRICA MANAGED TO AVOID? 
One overarching concern with PMC activity in African countries 
directly relates to the strength (or lack thereof) of countries’ militaries.73 
Contracting with a PMC may appear to be an easy solution to supplement 
a country’s lack of military strength.74 While it is true that some countries 
may require more immediate military and more security presence than 
others,
75
 South Africa seems to be capable of providing its own military 
and security might.
76
 The Democratic Republic of the Congo
77
 (“the 
Congo”) is in a vastly different position than South Africa, due to constant 
natural resource disputes that weaken the Congo’s military might78 and the 
United Nations’ inability to conduct effective peacekeeping operations in 
the region.
79
 Despite these circumstances, the Congo does not take an 
explicit stance either for or against mercenary activities in the region.
80
 
 
 
 73. Brooks, supra note 45. Brooks primarily argues that the declining military state of African 
countries provides a sort of window for PMC reliance. When considering the frequency of conflict in 
most African countries in combination with lack of resources and manpower to effectively combat 
enemy forces, Brooks’ argument may be a realistic concern. See infra note 79.  
 74. Brooks, supra note 46, at 1.  
 75. The issue of constant conflict concerning natural resources is a subject that will be discussed 
concerning the Congo area.  
 76. The South African National Defense Force still seems to be very active. Recent 
developments mostly include revamping of the South African Air Force and efforts taken against 
contraband. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) Recovers Contraband Goods, DEP’T 
OF DEF. OF THE REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.dod.mil.za/news/news%202011/Oct 
%2011/border_success.htm. However, there have been no recent developments of full military 
conflicts between South Africa and other countries.  
 77. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo are two different and 
neighboring countries. The discussion throughout will mostly refer to the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo as simply “the Congo” for the sake of brevity. When discussing the Republic of the Congo 
specifically, it will be referred to by its full title.  
 78. Jeff Koinange, Blood Diamonds: Miners Risk Lives for Chance at Riches, CNN (Dec. 12, 
2006), http://articles.cnn.com/2006-12-12/world/diamonds.koinange_1_conflict-diamonds-blood-diamonds 
-mbuji-mayi?_s=PM:WORLD. The term “Blood Diamonds” has often been used to describe African 
conflicts concerning the control over diamonds. Id. Koinange notes that blood diamonds have fueled 
much of Africa’s “dirtiest” wars, ranging from Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, and the Congo. Id. Most 
troubling is the fact that people from all ages mine diamonds in an effort to escape their impoverished 
lives. Id. In such situations, the potential for violations of human rights against all parties involved is 
very prevalent.  
 79. Deschamps, supra note 47, at 25. 
 80. As the analysis progresses, keep in mind that this potentially could be due to an implicit 
reliance on PMCs throughout the region.  
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The Congo has a rather troubled history.
81
 Armed conflicts over 
diamonds have occurred in the Congo and its neighboring countries for 
several decades.
82
 Due to these diamond conflicts, PMCs like Executive 
Outcomes
83
 operated heavily throughout the Congo.
84
 However, the Congo 
saw the use of mercenaries even before the proliferation of PMCs.
85
 The 
United Nations (“UN”) attempted to stabilize some areas in the Congo 
despite it being a mercenary hot-spot.
86
 UN peacekeeping operations in the 
Congo have, however, faced extraordinary opposition and only achieved 
minimal success.
87
 The most troubling aspect about the UN’s failed 
peacekeeping operations combined with the region’s instability is that the 
lack of effective international assistance may further incentivize PMCs to 
fill the gap.
88
 
Like South Africa, a country could potentially remedy the lack of 
international action by enacting their own legislation concerning PMCs 
and mercenary activities. Legislation on this subject is rather sparse, 
however, despite the Congo’s prior ties to PMCs.89 Historically, the Congo 
 
 
 81. Zaire changed into the Democratic Republic of the Congo on May 17, 1997. The World 
Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact book/ 
geos/cg.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 82. See Koinange, supra note 78.  
 83. See Randol, supra note 13; Chesterman, supra note 22; supra text accompanying note 51.  
 84. Deschamps, supra note 47, at 25. Most notably, PMCs and Private Security Companies 
continue to fight over natural resources even today. Id.  
 85. Id. The author notes that historically the Congo was somewhat accustomed to the “frozen 
embrace of mercenaries.” Id. Such infamous examples include Bob Denard and Mike Hoare, leaders of 
former German and French soldiers that committed war crimes. Id. The author describes them as 
“romantics” that were “in search of adventure and anti-communist/capitalist ideology.” Id.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. Some reasons include insufficiently trained troops, lack of international support, and poor 
logistical information. There have been calls for increased UN presence in the area, but typically such 
calls for assistance go unanswered. Id. The UN has attempted to impose arms embargoes to help 
rectify the lack of their presence in the region. Meike de Goede, Private and Public Security in Post-
War Democratic Republic of Congo, in THE PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR IN AFRICA COUNTRY SERIES 
NO. 146, 35, 35 (Sabelo Gumedze ed., 2008). However, Goede’s concern that PMCs often step into the 
realm of illegality, in combination with Deschamps’ concern of PMCs conducting “private 
peacekeeping” operations, is especially troubling.  
 88. “The absence of effective international action may drive the private sector to lead a private 
‘peacekeeping’ operation, backed by mining firm [sic] in order to protect their investments or to 
develop new ones.” Deschamps, supra note 47, at 25. 
 89. Dr. Joanna Spear, Market Forces: The Political Economy of Private Military Companies, 
FAFO REP. 531, 1, 22 (2006). Dr. Spear notes that the Congo has been known to be involved in hiring 
PMCs since the late 1990s, during the time period of the “Congo Wars.” Moreover, a cited source 
states that the Congo was “[e]ffectively renting military expertise from Zimbabwe in a manner not 
dissimilar to a private company.” David Shearer, Private Military Force and Challenges for the 
Future, 8 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFFAIRS, at 87 (1999).  
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has at best made an implicit stance towards mercenarism.
90
 The 
Constitution of the Congo fails to explicitly explore this issue in any 
depth.
91
 When considering the lack of legislation on the subject, it is very 
possible that the Congo indirectly supports the use of PMCs. Noting the 
violence surrounding “blood diamonds,”92 PMCs may be a sufficient 
domestic deterrence for a country that lacks the military power or political 
stability to supply its own deterrent. This exemplifies a phenomenon that 
Doug Brooks posited:
93
 a country with political instability may be forced 
to rely on a PMC as a source for hostility deterrence and safety.
94
 
UGANDA—LEAVING POSSIBILITIES OF REGULATION OPEN THROUGH 
LEGISLATION 
Like the Congo, Uganda also resides in a region that has been marred 
by a history of “insecurity, high crime rates and corruption.”95 This has led 
to a society that is aware of the need for private security, military 
companies, and militaries to ensure some semblance of its stability (and 
even to protect against potential human rights violations by other 
countries) when the government cannot.
96
 Ongoing threats to Uganda’s 
domestic safety, mostly stemming from border disputes, have also 
reinforced some form of reliance on PMCs.
97
 Unlike the Congo, Uganda 
 
 
 90. Spear, supra note 89, at 63. The Congo, Angola, Zaire, and other African countries were 
signatories of the “Organisation of African Unity ‘Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries’ of 
1972.” Id. However, it is also noted that those three countries have encouraged mercenary activity 
despite their signing of the Convention. Moreover, the Convention itself is not currently in effect. Id.  
 91. See CONST. DEM. REP. CONGO, 2005. The Constitution explores basic concepts of the 
“Congolese,” collective and individual rights, duties, and some basic structure of the government. 
Article 63 provides some insight when concerning the military; the article states, “All Congolese have 
the sacred right and duty to defend the country” and “compulsory military service may be established 
under the conditions prescribed by law.” Id. art. 64 (emphasis added). Moreover, “All national, 
provincial, local and customary authorities have the duty to safeguard the unity of the Republic . . . .” 
The contours of this “duty” are for the most part unknown in the context of potential PMC utilization. 
Id.  
 92. See Koinange, supra note 78. 
 93. Brooks, supra note 46. 
 94. See Randol, supra note 11. 
 95. Solomon Wilson Kirunda, Private and Public Security in Uganda, in THE PRIVATE 
SECURITY SECTOR IN AFRICA COUNTRY SERIES NO. 146, 1, 3 (Sabelo Gumedze ed., 2008).  
 96. Id. “This has created a security-conscious citizenry. Private security providers have emerged 
to meet their needs. . . . Ugandans have lived in a security-conscious setting for fear of the security 
situation relapsing into what they experienced during the regimes of Obote and Amin.” Id. These two 
regimes were known for “gross human rights violations that were perpetrated through government 
agencies.” Id. 
 97. Id. at 4. One of the main security threats as of 2008 concerned the Nile basin. Id. Several 
neighboring and bordering countries were vying for control and occupation of the basin. Id. Such 
countries include the Congo, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania, Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda. 
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has attempted to regulate the PMC activity in the past. One notable 
example is the Police Act of 1994.
98
 Even though the Police Act also 
attempts to deal with other problems pertaining to the Ugandan army and 
police force,
99
 this Note will analyze the Police Act as it affects PMCs. 
The Police Act of 1994 is one explicit example of legislation by 
Uganda that regulates PMC activity. It provides some basic criteria for the 
“control of private security organizations.”100 The Act gives the Ugandan 
Minister the power to make regulations
101
 on multiple subjects, including: 
control over PMC operations,
102
 requiring all PMCs to register with the 
government,
103
 setting forth the types of uniforms and equipment a PMC 
would use,
104
 and determining what fees or forms would be given pursuant 
to the Police Act’s purposes.105 Moreover, the Police Act defines a PMC-
esque group as one that performs private investigations or watches, 
guards, or patrols without actually being a part of the official Ugandan 
police or armed forces.
106
 This could create some legal ambiguity when 
considering there is not much that differentiates a PMC from the Ugandan 
official forces in terms of function under the Police Act, assuming that the 
PMC is officially recognized.
107
 In contrast to South Africa, it appears that 
the Ugandan government wants to maintain a greater presence and 
 
 
As a side effect, many small militias have “dump[ed]” small arms “uncontrollably” in Uganda. Id. 
Thus, due to such disputes on Ugandan borders and in countries surrounding Uganda, Uganda has 
been believed to possess “large stockpiles of small arms and light weapons.” Id. (internal citations 
omitted). 
 98. Police Act Stat. 13/1994 (Uganda).  
 99. The Police Act contains several provisions governing firearm and equipment usage by the 
Ugandan army and police force. See JACQUELINE MACALESHER & ANGUS URQUHART, UGANDA AND 
INTERNATIONAL SMALL ARMS TRANSFERS: IMPLEMENTING UN PROGRAMME OF ACTION 
COMMITMENTS, SAFERWORLD 8 (July 2008), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/ 
Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=90985 . 
 100. Police Act § 72.  
 101. Id. § 72(1). 
 102. Id. § 72(1)(a). 
 103. Id. § 72(1)(b)–(c). 
 104. Id. § 72(1)(d). 
 105. Id. § 72(e).  
 106. Id. § 72(2). Specifically, the Act states that a “private security organisation” is one that 
“undertakes private investigations as to facts or as to the character of a person, or one which performs 
services of watching, guarding, or patrolling for the purpose of providing protection against crime, but 
does not include the force, the prisons services or the armed forces of Uganda.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 107. Conceptually, PMCs could easily be utilized for the purpose of “protect[ing] against crime” 
simply by acting as a security or military force designed to protect their employers. Id. Even when 
addressing the argument that there may be a key difference between Private Military Companies and 
Private Security Companies, as both terms tend to overlap in the grand scheme of things; PMCs often 
include security work when ensuring the protection of key government areas and PSCs can exercise 
military work when engaging in armed conflict with other militias or when supplying itself with 
weaponry and equipment.  
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involvement in the actual activities and operations of PMCs.
108
 This route 
could prove dangerous; it almost encourages the assimilation of PMCs 
into the official government forces to the point that PMCs may circumvent 
international conventions concerning mercenarism.
109
  
This is not to say that a country could not be held judicially 
accountable for the acts of its PMCs under IHL, however, even if the 
process of doing so is immensely difficult in practice.
110
 Despite Uganda’s 
regulatory scheme, this approach may also create some issues in terms of 
handling mercenarism, even if it does not completely nullify the overall 
threat of IHL violations.
111
 In comparison to the regulations conducted by 
South Africa and the lack of regulation by the Congo, Uganda is an 
extreme case; a country could potentially control a PMC by directly 
assimilating the PMC into its own government.
112
  
 
 
 108. See, e.g., id. § 72(1)(d) (providing for the regulation of “uniforms and other equipment” used 
by private security organizations). In contrast, South Africa’s legislation never contained any 
provisions reserving the right to dictate uniforms and equipment of its hired PMCs. See Regulation of 
Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998.  
 109. The key concern is when a private military company would cease to be “private” under the 
Police Act. The concern is not so much the registration of a PMC, since South Africa overcame similar 
procedural hurdles. The main concern is the broad language the Police Act uses to reserve the ability 
to control the operations, activities, and equipment of a PMC. With this kind of control, there may be 
little conceptual difference between a police force and a PMC outside of status and specification. 
Potentially, the government could absorb a PMC into its own official forces with this kind of control. 
One concern includes whether or not a controlled PMC would be exclusive to the Ugandan 
government or whether it would still be free to contract with other countries (perhaps even subject to 
Uganda’s specifications). Unfortunately, there is not much judicial exploration on this issue. 
Moreover, the Police Act still is not designed to govern PMCs that operate outside of Uganda. See 
Kirunda, supra note 95, at 26.  
 110. There has been a recent scenario in which international humanitarian law still dictates that an 
“occupying power” must display certain conduct. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 ICJ 168 (Dec. 19). In 1998, there was some issue as to 
whether or not the Congo consented to the presence of Ugandan troops within its territory. Id. at 168. 
Ultimately, the court found that Uganda was “responsible for actions of private actors.” Doswald-
Beck, supra note 8, at 133. The court further found that the Hague Regulations of 1907 also applied as 
Uganda has a responsibility to prevent violations of international humanitarian law. Id. This case was 
important when considering that a country could potentially still be held responsible for the acts of its 
endorsed PMCs (or at least PMCs that operate in its country regardless of the presence of regulations 
or lack thereof). But this venue is difficult because the litigation process, including evidence collection 
and witness gathering, would be costly and difficult across two different countries. Id. Moreover, it is 
easier to try such violators as individuals in their own countries as opposed to as a PMC. Id. at 134–35. 
Other factors such as impunity can also make a judicial resolution difficult in practice (especially if a 
PMC was given immunity of jurisdiction by the courts of the country where the crime took place). Id.  
 111. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 111, at 133–35.  
 112. See Kirunda, supra note 95, at 26; supra text accompanying note 110.  
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ANGOLA—HOSTILITY TO “NEW MERCENARISM” WITH A HISTORY OF 
PMC ACTIVITY 
Angola represents a strange case in the overall analysis. From a 
statistical standpoint, the number of PMCs that operated in Angola was 
quite high, especially in recent decades.
113
 Like in the Congo and Uganda, 
domestic strife over natural resources and political instability have 
potentially created a need for PMCs.
114
 The state of legislation concerning 
regulation of private military and security companies is vague.
115
 Angola 
has at least taken a stance against mercenarism,
116
 however, despite its 
gaps in legislation.
117
 
The first potential source of Angola’s stance concerning mercenarism 
is within its 2010 Constitution.
118
 The Constitution ensures protection of 
“basic human rights”119 and “freedoms of individuals and members of 
organised social groups.”120 Unlike the other countries discussed, Angola’s 
Constitution specifically grants the government alone the power to ensure 
the country’s national security and compliance with international law.121 
 
 
 113. See JULIE BERG, UNIV. OF CAPETOWN INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, ANGOLAN POLICING 
OVERVIEW IN: OVERVIEW OF PLURAL POLICING OVERSIGHT IN SELECT SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
DEVELOPMENT (SADC) COUNTRIES (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.aprn.org.za/File_uploads/ 
File/SADCpolicingoversight2005.pdf. Julie Berg traces the increase of PMC activity in Angola to its 
civil war in the mid 1990s. Id. at 5. Some reports note that Angola’s private security industry has 
“flourished.” Id.; see also Herbert Howe, Global Order and Security Privatization, 140 STRATEGIC 
FORUM 1 (1998) (detailing the struggle of nation-states to maintain their monopoly on power and the 
consequent rise of PMCs). Estimates of private security firms operating in Angola are around 80, 
compared with the five that operated in Angola in 1993. BERG, supra, at 5.  
 114. BERG, supra note 113, at 5. Berg notes that one of the primary causes of instability in Angola 
is the diamond industry. Id. Specifically, “[t]he diamond industry has reportedly been the cause of 
many human rights violations by Angolan police and private security alike as attempts have been made 
by the government to re-claim and control the industry.” Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 115. In response to the increasing proliferation of mercenarism as a business venture, the Angolan 
government has at least shown cognizance of the phenomenon. There has at least been some 
discussion in terms of controlling the activities of PMCs. Id. at 5–6 (internal citations omitted). The 
discussion also included possible differentiation between “illegal” and “legal” mercenary and PMC 
activity respectively. While this may imply that Angola attempted to incorporate regulation like South 
Africa and Uganda, Julie Berg states, “It is not clear to what extent legislation exists in Angola which 
regulates private military and security companies but the government seems committed to the 
application of [a] combination of international, regional and national legislation that specifically 
targets mercenarism.” Id. at 5–6 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
 116. The stance taken by Angola with regard to mercenarism, at least as it exists today, goes 
beyond the Congo’s “implicit” stance. See infra notes 128–44. 
 117. BERG, supra note 113, at 5–6.  
 118. CONST. ANGOLA, 2010. 
 119. Id. art 2, ¶ 2. 
 120. Id. art. 2, ¶ 2. 
 121. Id. art 202. “The state, with the involvement of citizens, shall be responsible for guaranteeing 
national security, observing the Constitution, the law and any international instruments to which 
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The Constitution does contain a vague caveat to this language, as Angola 
still reserves the right to use “legitimate force”122 to achieve those ends. 
This portion of the Constitution gives some insight into the term force as 
being in accordance with the Constitution and international law.
123
 The 
Constitution seems to imply that Angola prioritizes international law.
124
 
Based on these facts alone and given the attitude of international law 
toward PMC activity, it is still unclear whether or not Angola affirms or 
rejects PMC activity through legislation.
125
 However, Angola has recently 
explicitly stated its opinion on mercenary activity. 
Angola’s concerns with “new mercenarism”126 were addressed by the 
Geneva International Model of the United Nations (“GIMUN”). 
According to GIMUN, Angola’s proposition against mercenarism is 
evidently two-fold: (1) it wants the UN to create a new definition for 
“mercenary”;127 and (2) it proposes an alternate scheme to control Private 
Militaries and Private Security Companies.
128
 Angola voices concern with 
the concept of “new mercenarism,”129 or mercenarism as a business 
venture. The proposal also includes the potential dangers to human rights 
that new mercenarism poses.
130
 Angola believes that the current definition 
of mercenarism should extend to participation in both international and 
 
 
Angola is a party.” Id. art. 202, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). Even though it is possible that a route of 
regulation that blurs the lines between PMC and state, such as Uganda’s, could potentially implicate 
Article 202, Angola’s perspective on mercenarism will be discussed further.  
 122. Id. art 203. “The Republic of Angola shall act using all appropriate legitimate means to 
preserve national security and shall reserve the right to resort to legitimate force to restore peace and 
public order, in compliance with the Constitution, the law and international law.” Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 123. Id. When combined with the precarious position that PMCs have in the realm of international 
law, however, “legitimate force” may not automatically exclude PMC usage. No definitive answer to 
this question likely exists, as there is not much material exploring what “legitimate force” actually 
means. Id. 
 124. Id. art. 202. 
 125. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 122.  
 126. Geneva Int’l Model United Nations, Sec. Council, Angola’s Proposal to the Commission on 
Human Rights (2005).  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 2.  
 129. Id. at 1. “The ‘new mercenarism’ prevalent in Angola included the interrelation of traditional 
mercenary activities with big business, involved in extraction of valuable natural resources, 
particularly diamonds.” Angola urged international bodies to look “beyond ‘traditional’ mercenarism.” 
Id.  
 130. Id. The proposal indicates that new mercenarism threatens “the right to life, physical integrity 
or freedom of individuals . . . peace, political stability, the legal order and the rational exploitation of 
natural resources in the regions where they operate.” Id. (emphasis added). “Rational” exploitation sets 
a different precedent from the “blood diamond”-type of exploitation of natural resources through 
implication. See Koinange, supra note 78. 
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internal conflicts.
131
 In other words, Angola believes that the concept of 
new mercenarism must be “borne in mind” as a “complex crime” capable 
of meriting prosecution for all culpable parties anywhere.
132
 Angola wants 
mercenary status to be more than just a legal question;
133
 it wants 
mercenary status to be an exceedingly complex concept that must be 
analyzed in terms of actors, acts, and potential threats to “security and 
international peace.”134 
Second, GIMUN notes that Angola proposed an alternate scheme for 
controlling PMC activity. Angola’s main concern was that PMCs and the 
governments who hire them often hide their true intentions under the 
façade of “peacekeeping.”135 In an attempt to overcome this phenomenon, 
Angola supports a combination of international, regional, and national 
legislation that specifically targets PMCs and other Military/Security 
Services to “avoid the involvement of [PMCs/Security Services] into 
mercenary activities on the continent.”136 In other words, Angola supports 
a “framework that [works] uniformly across the board.”137 In support of 
 
 
 131. Angola’s Proposal to the Commission on Human Rights, supra note 126, at 2. Also, recall 
that the Geneva Convention Protocol I concerned solely international conflicts and how Protocol II 
concerned non-international conflicts. See Protocol I, supra note 24; Protocol II, supra note 33; supra 
text accompanying note 33. Angola is essentially calling for a legislative reform that would not 
distinguish mercenarism in regards to international conflict from mercenarism concerning non-
international conflict.  
 132. Id. “It must also be borne in mind that mercenary activity is a complex crime in which 
criminal responsibility falls upon those who recruited, employed, trained and financed the mercenary 
or mercenaries, and upon those who planned and ordered his criminal activity.” Id. As an aside, 
Angola admitted that mercenary activity has surfaced in its own internal conflicts. “We must admit 
that during the 27 years of Civil War mercenary activities emerged in internal conflict situation [sic].” 
Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. GIMUN notes four recommendations when taking “new mercenarism” into account: 
(1) The concept of a mercenary should cover the participation of mercenaries in both 
international and internal armed conflicts. 
(2) To link mercenarism to crimes committed by mercenaries, which had become prevalent. 
(3) Mercenary activity should be considered not only in relation to the self-determination of 
peoples but also as encompassing a broad range of actions, including the destabilization of 
constitutional governments, various kinds of illicit trafficking, terrorism and violations of 
fundamental rights. 
(4) It is necessary to make a distinction between those acts which are already prohibited acts 
and acts which required criminalization. 
Id. 
 135. Id. at 2. “The main issue concerning the PMCs is that their activities, often hidden under the 
shroud of peacekeeping operations and providing help to national governments in maintaining stability 
during the crisis situations, are nothing more but mercenarisms.” Id.  
 136. Id.; see also BERG, supra note 113, at 7–8. 
 137. Angola’s Proposal to the Commission on Human Rights, supra note 126, at 1. The complete 
issue states, “Although different regions of the world had and still have their own specific problems in 
regard to the security industry, the same private companies operate across the world. It might be 
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the previously mentioned strategy, countries at the regional and national 
level could focus on “regionally targeted strategies.”138 This approach 
focuses more on “controlling and monitoring” PMCs within the region.139 
According to GIMUN, Angola supports
140
 legislative language that takes 
PMCs outside of the “grey areas of international law”141 and compensates 
for the lack of PMC-related legislation in most countries.
142
  
It is unknown whether or not international bodies like the UN took 
these suggestions for mercenarism reform under serious consideration. As 
of early 2010, however, several unnamed African countries were tasked 
with discussing this very issue.
143
 Whether or not the UN eventually takes 
Angola’s proposal to heart in terms of implementing and encouraging 
international, regional, and national legislation still remains to be seen.  
 
 
useful, therefore, when regulating the private security industry, to have a framework that worked 
uniformly across the board.” Id.  
 138. Id. “At the same time, regional mechanisms and national legislation could go beyond those 
standards to produce more regionally targeted strategies.” Id. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. The recommendations on this issue are summarized as: 
(1) An important way to regulate private military companies is to set thresholds for 
permissible activity, systems of registration and oversight mechanisms. 
(2) Application of combination of international, regional and national legislation that 
specifically targets mercenarism. 
(3) Any structures of international supervision of such companies would have to be instituted 
under the Economic and Social Council. They could provide oversight on legislation and 
serve as a basis for collating information, and scrutinizing and recording contracts between 
companies and host and receiving States on the basis of international human rights and 
humanitarian law standards. 
(4) Establishing national regulatory mechanisms to ensure transparency in the industry. 
Id.  
 141. Id. “Government of Angola believes that mercenary activities of PMCs exist in the ‘grey 
areas’ of international law.” Id.  
 142. Id.  
At [sic] present moment only a few countries have included [PMCs/Security services] in their 
national legislation and as a consequence [PMCs/Security Services] exist internationally 
without effective regulation. . . . [Angola] believes that international regulation would supply 
the legal framework for these services and provide them with both legitimacy and well-
defined laws to abide by. 
Id. 
 143. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r on Human Rights, UN and Africa to discuss Mercenaries 
and Private Military and Security Companies (Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=9844&LangID=E. 
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FINAL SYNTHESIS—POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE ISSUE OF 
MERCENARISM 
When exploring the different methods of the discussed countries, there 
are four potential options for ensuring that a PMC cannot violate 
international humanitarian laws without penalty: (1) Completely ban PMC 
usage; (2) Regulate PMC usage with discretion left to each country; 
(3) Opt for a comprehensive and uniform legislative approach 
(international, regional, and national legislation targeting PMC activity); 
(4) Alter the Geneva Convention alone to explicitly include PMC activity 
under mercernarism. The first option—completely banning PMC usage—
has some issues when considering that countries like the Congo, Uganda, 
and many others have governmental and regional instability that makes 
self-protection quite difficult. Under that argument, there would still be an 
issue as to whether or not a suitable replacement for a PMC could be 
supplied for such countries, as even UN forces have struggled to maintain 
peace in those regions.
144
 The second option—regulating PMC usage with 
discretion left to each country—better resembles the system that is already 
in place; some countries regulate with varying amounts of strength while 
some do not regulate PMC activity at all. This may have the side effect, 
however, of placing PMCs into an undefined grey area between being a 
“private company” and a “government instrumentality.”145 The 
comprehensive approach is ideally the best solution.
146
 The biggest 
advantage is that this mode of reform would address PMCs in a uniform 
methodology that other countries can easily adopt.
147
 Unfortunately, this 
approach would take an unprecedented amount of work to quickly create 
and effectively enforce.
148
 Moreover, at the regional and national level, 
such legislation might be contrary to the interests of many African 
 
 
 144. Deschamps, supra note 47, at 25. As previously noted, UN Peacekeeping Forces, while 
formidable, often encounter much difficulty in maintaining the peace in high conflict areas in Africa. 
Id. Realistically, a PMC could exert a greater presence in such areas due to financial support and 
reimbursement in exchange for their services. The UN would not be able to take advantage of such an 
arrangement and their resources would ultimately be finite.  
 145. This issue applies to both South Africa and Uganda in some respects.  
 146. Id. “Effective regulation of PMCs and PSCs requires an interlocking framework of national, 
regional, and international control mechanisms.” Kirunda, supra note 95, at 17.  
 147. See Angola’s Proposal to the Commission on Human Rights, supra note 126, at 2. The 
proposal discusses the benefits of an adoptable and “uniform” legislative effort. Id. It could very well 
apply to PMC activities across the world and would also better ensure that international humanitarian 
laws applicable to the world would not be easily violated by PMC activity.  
 148. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 8, at 134–35. 
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countries, if not many countries across the globe.
149
 The final option, while 
being the most cost-efficient option, may not do much in terms of 
protecting IHLs, especially if such countries either disregard the Geneva 
Convention or find some possible legal loophole to be exploited for 
decades.
150
 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the difficulty present in implementing such a change, the 
comprehensive approach suggested by Angola may potentially be the best 
option to combat “new mercenarism.” It focuses on PMCs internationally, 
addresses regional and national issues, and could potentially fill in the 
legal gaps left by the Geneva Convention. Even though a wide-scale 
proliferation of PMCs has not yet occurred in Africa, this analysis must 
emphasize three points: (1) Many of the world’s leading PMCs are housed 
in Africa; (2) Many African countries are high conflict areas today; and 
(3) PMCs still have a great international presence in war and conflicts 
worldwide, and one PMC can have a great international ripple effect.
151
 
When considering the history of human rights violations committed by 
mercenary groups, it would be prudent to learn where and how a country 
can effectively regulate PMC activity. This would ensure that mercenary 
history marred with human rights violations does not become the 
international community’s grim future due merely to a few legislative 
gaps. 
                                        Mathew Kincade III* 
 
 
 149. When using Africa as an example, countries that regulate PMC activity or enjoy PMC 
activity would be quite impaired by a uniform piece of legislation that limits the usability of potential 
PMC clients.  
 150. For a specific example, recall the issue surrounding the “person” language in Protocol I of 
the Geneva Convention. Even to this day, the scope of “person” has not been explicitly articulated in 
the convention. See Protocol I, supra note 24. 
 151. See supra text accompanying note 16. Again, recall that one of the greatest wars that 
mankind has ever known started with a domino effect of alliances (World War I). The very same issue 
could occur because a PMC decided to act outside of its authority. Thus, the international nature of this 
analysis still remains a pressing factor; the actions of one poorly governed PMC and any potential 
violation of human rights can potentially have long-lasting effects on a myriad of countries around the 
world.  
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